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Abstract—A smart grid is a power system that uses in-
formation and communication technology to operate, monitor,
and control data flows between the power generating source
and the end user. It aims at high efficiency, reliability, and
sustainability of the electricity supply process that is provided
by the utility centre and is distributed from generation stations
to clients. To this end, energy-efficient multicast communication
is an important requirement to serve a group of residents in a
neighbourhood. However, the multicast routing introduces new
challenges in terms of secure operation of the smart grid and
user privacy. In this paper, after having analysed the security
threats for multicast-enabled smart grids, we propose a novel
multicast routing protocol that is both sufficiently secure and
energy efficient. We also evaluate the performance of the proposed
protocol by means of computer simulations, in terms of its energy-
efficient operation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Smart grid (SG) is a modernized electrical grid that oper-
ates with sensors and smart devices (SDs). It uses advanced
communication and control technologies for monitoring and
automation to enable flexible, efficient, and reliable power
delivery and distribution [1], [2]. Due to significant hetero-
geneity of devices and communication technologies used in
SGs, they are more vulnerable to security threats and attacks
compared with traditional communication networks [3]. The
proposed methods for securing SG devices and infrastructure
against security attacks include access control, host intrusion
detection, and system hardening. However, the integration of
cyber technology with the SGs and industrial control systems
reveals new security vulnerabilities and attack threats [4], [5].
Furthermore, multicast routing has been recognized as
an important requirement for SGs to enable efficient data
exchange between utility management software and groups
of smart meters (SMs) [6], [7]. Some examples of multicast
routing applications in SGs include monitoring and protection,
requests for periodic meter readings, and demand-response
programs [9], [8]. However, the multicast routing introduces
new challenges in terms of secure operation of the smart
grid and user privacy. Although some works that study these
problems have recently appeared in the literature, there are still
some remaining issues to be addressed [10].
In this paper, we introduce a novel multicast routing pro-
tocol that is both sufficiently secure and energy efficient. We
describe both, the authentication phase and the communication
phase. The authentication phase, registers a group of SMs
with a network entity called group controller (GC) that acts
as certificate authority. After that, during the communication
phase, SMs periodically collect energy consumption informa-
tion for SDs and send the aggregated consumption information
to the network operations centre (NOC). The latter is located
at the utility network side and is responsible for the control
and operation of SG. Also, from time to time, NOC sends
control messages to SMs, e.g. instructing them to reduce the
home energy consumption during the peak hours. Finally, we
evaluate the proposed protocol in terms of its energy-efficient
operation.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we review
the relevant works on secure communications for SGs. In
Section III, we describe the considered network model for
SG. In Section IV, we describe our proposed secure multicast
protocol. In Section V, we evaluate the performance of the
proposed protocol by means of computer simulations. Finally,
we conclude in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review current research works related
to SG security, authentication, and key management.
A number of works propose secure communication proto-
cols for SGs. Khurana et al. [11] describe the design princi-
ples for SG cyber-infrastructure authentication protocols. They
point out that the design of an authentication mechanism for
SG is a challenging task and is prone to significant errors
if not done carefully. Kim et al. [12] propose a protocol for
secure unicast, multicast, and broadcast communications in
SG. This protocol applies a binary tree approach and aims at
reducing the computational overhead. However, the proposed
approach does not provide sufficient security when one or
more nodes join or leave the session, as may happen, e.g.,
in case of node failures. Li et al. [13] propose a distributed
data aggregation approach for SG. According to this approach,
multiple smart meters are involved in aggregation and routing
to the collector unit. To achieve secure routing and to protect
user privacy, homomorphic encryption is used. However, this
approach does not protect against replay attacks and against
malicious manipulation of aggregated data.
Key management and authentication schemes for SGs have
also attracted some research efforts. Wu et al. [14] propose
a key management scheme for SG. The proposed scheme is
based on public keys and secures against man-in-the-middle
and replay attacks. However, both public-key infrastructure
and third-party trusted anchors are required. This increases the
complexity of the overall solution and also does not perform
well in case of multicasting. Nicanfar et al. [15] proposed a
key management protocol for data communication between the
TABLE I. ABBREVIATIONS
AMI Advanced Metering Infrastructure
FAN Field Area Network
GC Group Controller
HAN Home Area Network
NAN Neighbourhood Area Network
NOC Network Operations Centre
PKI Public-Key Infrastructure
SD Smart Device
SDD Smart Device with Duplex communication
SDS Smart Device with Simplex communication
SG Smart Grid
SM Smart Meter
SN Serial Number
UKMF Unified Key Management Framework
WAN Wide Area Network
utility server and SMs. However, the authentication method
between the SM and the home appliances has not been
addressed. Das et al. [16] proposed a unified key management
framework (UKMF) for cross-layer peer entity authentication.
This mechanism has applicability in SGs, especially for smart
metering, where SMs are assumed to be low-cost wireless
devices for which repeated peer entity authentication attempts
for each protocol can be contributed to increased system
overhead. The proposed mechanism is flexible in that peer
entity authentication can be treated as either network access
authentication or application-level authentication. However,
the bootstrap application ciphering is an important and as
yet missing piece to realizing the unified key management
framework vision. Yee et al. [17] proposed a key management
scheme for a wide-area measurement system in SG. The
scheme is targeting a concrete set of security objectives derived
from NIST’s security impact level ratings. The authors identify
multicast authentication as the primary challenge. Li et al.
[18] identify the requirements for multicast communication
and multicast authentication in SG. They study the suitability
of one-time signature for multicast authentication in SG and
show that this solution results in short delays and low compu-
tational cost. However, the aforementioned gains are limited
to the cases where receivers have limited storage or where the
communication is frequent and short.
III. NETWORK MODEL
In this section, we describe our considered SG network
architecture, comprising three tiers (Fig. 1). Next, we introduce
some basic definitions and notations. Finally, we discuss three
types of security attacks in SG and define the considered threat
model.
All abbreviations used in the paper are listed in Table I.
A. Network Architecture
The considered SG architecture comprises three following
tiers.
Tier 1: Home Area Network (HAN). A HAN connects the
in-house SDs with a SM. A SM acts as a gateway between the
in-house devices and the external parties. The electric utility
manages the power distribution within the SG, collects sub-
hourly power usage from SMs, and sends notifications to SMs
when required. SM receives messages from devices within
the HAN and sends them to the appropriate service provider
Fig. 1. Smart grid network model.
[24]. We assume a single SM per house and a star topology
of multiple SDs with SM at the centre. The communication
between SDs and SM is achieved via any appropriate and
available technology, such as ZigBee [19], 6LoWPAN [20],
wired or wireless Ethernet, Bluetooth [21], etc. We consider
two types of home SDs:
• SDDs: devices that support duplex communication, i.e.
that are able to both send and receive messages to and
from SM.
• SDSs: devices that support simplex communication,
i.e. that are able only to send messages to SM.
Tier 2: Neighbourhood Area Network (NAN). A NAN
connects SMs to local access points (GCs) for Advanced
Metering Infrastructure (AMI) applications [22]. This can be
a network of SMs creating a mesh, as well as part of a mesh
network, which consists of SMs and gateways that relay data.
A version of the network, which is deployed to collect data
TABLE II. NOTATIONS
Hn Number of houses in neighbourhood n
GCn Group controller of neighbourhood n
SMh,n Smart meter in house h and neighbourhood n
Ih,n Number of duplex smart devices in house h and neighbourhood n
Jh,n Number of simplex smart devices in house h and neighbourhood n
SDDi,h,n Duplex smart device i in house h and neighbourhood n
SDSj,h,n Simplex smart device j in house h and neighbourhood n
EPubKeyGC public key of group controller
IDSM Identity number of smart meter
SymKeySM Symmetric key shared between a smart meter and its group controller
IDGC Identity number of group controller
SNSM Serial number of smart meter
SNNSM Serial number of new smart meter
EPubKeyPSM Public key of proxy smart meter
SymKeyNSM Symmetric key shared between a new smart meter
and its group controller
ESessKey Session key shared between the group controller
and all SMs of the group
EPubKeyNOC Public key of the network operations centre
TS Timestamp
from power lines, mobile workforce, towers, etc., for power
grid monitoring, is referred to as Field Area Network (FAN). In
this paper, we will use NAN to refer to both types of networks.
The coverage of a NAN is around 1 − 10 square miles. The
data rate would be higher than that of HANs, and in the order
of 10− 1000 Kbps [6].
Tier 3: Wide Area Network (WAN). A WAN is a large
network that connects GCs to the network operations centre
(NOC) at the utility provider. The communication within a
WAN can be performed using WiMax, GSM/WCDMA/LTE,
or fibre optics [23].
B. Basic Definitions and Notations
The whole area of the SG is divided into N neighbour-
hoods. A neighbourhood n(n = 1, ..., N) consists of Hn
houses. Each house h(h = 1, ..,Hn) in a neighbourhood n
has a smart meter, SMh,n. Each neighbourhood n has an
associated group controller, GCn, that controls all SMs within
this neighbourhood. SMs are connected to their GCn either
directly or indirectly (i.e., via other SMs). This effectively
forms the NAN, as it was also described in previous subsection.
GCs are connected, via some WAN (e.g. Internet), to NOC at
the utility provider.
A house h in neighbourhood n has Ih,n SDDs and
Jh,n SDSs, denoted as SDDi,h,n(i = 1, ..., Ih,n) and
SDSj,h,n(j = 1, .., Jh,n), respectively. This effectively forms
the HAN.
All notations used in the paper appear in Table II.
C. Security Attacks and Threat Model
Below we briefly describe the major types of attacks on
SG and our considered threat model.
Replay attack: The attacker re-sends a valid and authen-
ticated message in order to waste energy at the receiver or to
cause delay. This attack is possible if the message or its digital
signature does not contain a timestamp.
Black hole attack: The attacker aims at reducing the
amount of data available to legitimate users. This can be
Fig. 2. Direct authentication
achieved by dropping the received messages, instead of send-
ing them further according to the protocol requirements. Fur-
thermore, the attacker may influence the routing table of other
nodes, so that the traffic will flow through a compromised
node.
Wormhole attack: The attacker receives the packet at one
point in the network, sends it to another point, and then replays
the packet from that point.
Threat model: As it was mentioned before, some SMs
may be used to relay messages from other SMs to GC and
vice versa. We assume that some SMs may be compromised
and take this into account in the design of our multicast routing
protocol. In particular, we design a secure protocol to mitigate
against the three aforementioned types of attacks. We assume
that GCs and SDs are not compromised.
IV. SECURE MULTICAST ROUTING PROTOCOL
A. Assumptions
We make the following assumptions:
• A SM may need to communicate with GC via other
SMs, which may be compromised. Therefore mutual
authentication between SM and GC is anticipated.
• All SMs are registered with their associated GC.
• GC is responsible for multicasting and is an aggregator
and router for communication with other groups. Fur-
thermore, because of the secure routing issues between
GC and NOC, we assume that they have a longer
transmission range compared with an ordinary node.
• We assume that an adversary could eavesdrop on all
traffic or replay older messages.
• GC is not compromised.
Fig. 3. Indirect authentication
• SDs are not compromised.
B. Authentication Phase
GC is responsible for authenticating all SMs belonging to
its group. We consider the following two cases:
• Direct authentication: Performed when the new SM
has a direct connection with GC.
• Indirect authentication: Performed when the new SM
has no direct connection with GC. In that case, the
authentication of a new SM is facilitated by another,
already authenticated SM, referred to as proxy SM.
Direct authentication
Initially, the new SM will send the Authentication Request
message to GC (Fig. 2). This message is encrypted using GC’s
public key, EPubKeyGC , and includes the following informa-
tion: a) identity number of new SM, IDSM , b) timestamp,
TS, c) symmetric key of new SM, SymKeySM .
GC responds with the Authentication Response message.
This message is encrypted using the received SymKeySM
and includes the following information: a) identity number of
GC, IDGC , b) timestamp, TS.
Next, SM sends its Serial Number, SNSM , so that GC may
validate this SM as a legitimate one. This message is encrypted
using the SymKeySM and includes the following information:
a) serial number of new SM, SNSM , b) timestamp, TS.
Finally, GC responds with the Authentication Confirma-
tion message. This message is encrypted using the received
SymKeySM and includes the following information: a) iden-
tity number of GC, IDGC , b) timestamp, TS, c) serial number
of new SM, SNSM .
Indirect authentication
Fig. 4. Reporting energy consumption from HAN to NOC.
Initially, the new SM will send the Authentication Request
message to the proxy SM (Fig. 3). This message is en-
crypted using proxy’s public key, EPubKeyPSM , and includes
the following information: a) identity number of new SM,
IDNSM , b) timestamp, TS, c) symmetric key of new SM,
SymKeyNSM .
The proxy SM will decrypt and re-encrypt the message
using GC’s public key, EPubKeyGC , and will send it to GC.
GC responds to proxy SM with the Authentication Re-
sponse message. This message is encrypted using proxy’s pub-
lic key, EPubKeyPSM , and includes the following information:
a) identity number of GC, IDGC , b) timestamp, TS, c) serial
number of new SM, SNNSM .
The proxy SM will decrypt and re-encrypt this message
using the previously received SymKeyNSM and will send
the message to the new SM.
Next, new SM sends its Serial Number, SNNSM , so that
proxy SM may validate the new SM as a legitimate one. This
message is encrypted using SymKeyNSM and includes the
following information: a) serial number of new SM, SNNSM ,
b) timestamp, TS.
Finally, if the authentication is successful, the proxy SM
responds to both new SM and GC with the Authentication
Confirmation message. This message is encrypted for new
SM using SymKeySM and for GC using EPubKeyGC , and
includes the following information: a) identity number of
GC, IDGC , b) timestamp, TS, c) serial number of new SM,
SNNSM .
C. Communication Phase
After the authentication phase is over, SMs may commu-
nicate with NOC, via their associated GC. We consider the
following two communication scenarios, shown also in Figs.
3 and 4.
Reporting energy consumption
Fig. 5. Sending control message from NOC to HAN.
SDs periodically send their energy consumption to SM. For
example, in Fig. 4, SD1 reports y Joules and SD2 reports x
Joules.
Next, SM aggregates the received consumption data (i.e.,
x+y) from all SDs, encrypts the message using its symmetric
key, SymKeySM , and sends to GC. Recall that, after the
authentication phase, GC knows the symmetric keys of all SMs
in its group.
Finally, GC, after having authenticated this message, re-
encrypts it with NOC’s public key, EPubKeyNOC and sends
to NOC.
Sending control messages
From time to time, NOC sends various control messages to
GCs and eventually to SMs. For example, in Fig. 5, NOC sends
the Reduce Consumption message with suggested reduction of
x%. This could be the case when the energy consumption is
too high or during peak-hours. NOC encrypts this message
using GC’s public key, EPubKeyGC .
GC, after authenticating NOC, will multicast the received
control message to all SMs. In order to support multicast, GC
will use a session key that is shared among all SMs, ESessKey.
Finally, SMs decrypt the control message and forward it to
SDDs (recall that SDSs are not able to receive messages).
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the pro-
posed multicast routing protocol in terms of energy-efficiency.
To this end, we simulate the proposed protocol in NS-3 [25].
A. Simulation Setup
We simulate a SG network consisting of a) one NOC
connected to one GC b) GC is connected to 10 SMs, which
are inter-connected in a random mesh topology c) each SM
is connected to 6 SDs (3 SDDs and 3 SDSs). Recall that
the former are able to both receive and send data, whereas
the latter are able only to send data. SDs are placed at fixed
random locations inside the house and communicate with SM
using IEEE 802.15.4 and data transfer rates of 200 Kbps. SMs
communicate with each other and with GC using IEEE 802.16
(WiMax) and data rates of 10 Mbps.
SDs generate energy consumption data at periodic intervals
of 15 min (similarly to [26]) and of varying sizes 50-500 bytes
(according to [27]). These consumption data are aggregated at
corresponding SM and are sent to NOC via GC, as described in
Section IV. Also, NOC at random time intervals sends control
messages. These messages are initially received at GC and then
multicasted to SMs. Finally, SMs forward these messages to
SDDs.
B. Results-Discussion
Initially, we evaluate the average device energy consump-
tion. In Fig. 6, we present the results for both SDDs and SDSs.
The results show that for small packet sizes (50-150 bytes)
the average energy consumption of both SDDs and SDSs
is approximately the same. For larger packet sizes, SDDs
consume more energy in comparison with SDSs. This is due
to the fact, that SDDs not only send data but also receive data
from SM. We also observe that when increasing the packet
size 10 times (from 50 to 500 bytes), the energy consumption
increases very little: approximately 6% for SDDs and by 2%
for SDSs.
Next, we evaluate the average traffic demands of the pro-
posed multicast protocol. To this end, we compare the traffic
reduction of the multicast mode as compared with the unicast
mode. The results of Fig. 7 show that for small packets of
50 bytes, the multicast mode sends approximately 80% (74%)
of the traffic in unicast mode for SDDs (SDSs). However, as
the packet size increases to 500 bytes, the traffic reduction
becomes more significant: 47% for SDDs and 36% for SDSs.
We also observe that the traffic reduction is higher for SDSs.
This is due to the fact that the multicast mode can be used
only for the communication from SM to devices, but not from
devices (i.e. SDDs) to SM.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a novel multicast protocol
for smart grids. The proposed protocol is both sufficiently
secure and energy-efficient, as confirmed by simulation studies.
In particular, we prevent some potentially compromised smart
meters from issuing a number of security attacks, such as
replay, black hole, and wormhole attacks. To this end, we
introduce a new entity, called group controller, that acts as
security associate. This entity is responsible for authenticating
a group of smart meters and for key management. In cases
where a smart meter is not directly connected to the group
controller, we use indirect authentication which uses a pre-
viously authenticated proxy. In our future work, we plan to
investigate the cooperation of multiple group controllers, from
the security viewpoint.
Fig. 6. Energy consumption vs packet size.
Fig. 7. Traffic reduction vs packet size.
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